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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

JAN 6 1961

Dear Allen:

I have carefully reviewed the recommendations included in the report of the Joint Study Group and approve and endorse Recommendations Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

I approve the principles embodied in Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 but am not prepared at this time to endorse the methods recommended for implementation of these principles. These matters will be given further study with a view to determining the best method of implementation with the minimum disruption of operations and activities. It is my belief that implementation of these recommendations must be an evolutionary process.

I continue to feel that the peacetime investment of military resources and the overriding military need in wartime for photo-reconnaissance make it imperative that the Department of Defense control and operate a National Photographic Intelligence Center, which is referred to in Recommendation No. 16. The military services and commands have the greatest volume of photo intelligence consumer requirements for the maintenance of war plans, target charts, maps, etc., and they have the preponderance of personnel and resources engaged in their exploitation. Further, they have the continuing responsibility to organize and train personnel for the wartime conduct of photographic reconnaissance and the exploitation of its results. In wartime, the military establishment will become even more the primary source of photographic reconnaissance requirements and the prime consumer of photographic intelligence.

Recommendations Nos. 21, 22 and 23 propose establishment of a central requirements facility, use of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Central Reference as a reference facility, and the establishment of a program for the integration of all collection requirements manuals into a compatible series of coordinated guides, etc. While this may appear to be a desirable goal for the future, it is my opinion that the matters referred to in these recommendations should be given further study.

I do not concur with Recommendation No. 29. I do concur with the dissent expressed by the representative of the Secretary of Defense, as outlined on pages 91 and 92 of the Joint Study Group report.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED.

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I concur with Recommendation No. 30 but believe that implementation of this recommendation should be delayed until the principles enunciated in Recommendations Nos. 1 and 2 have been implemented to such a degree that this reorganization can be undertaken without serious disruption of intelligence activities and operations within the Department of Defense. The same comments apply to Recommendation No. 35.

In order that the Department of Defense may begin implementation of certain of the Recommendations of the Joint Study Group which I have approved, I am submitting a request for certain minor changes in the National Security Council Intelligence Directives at an early date.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,



Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington 25, D. C.

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